

Director  
Intelligence Community Staff

9 August 1982

NOTE FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Chairman, SECOM's memo re IG/CM

Bob's memo, attached, reached my office after Bill had already signed the SIG(I) directive establishing the IG/CI and IG/CM. Although I do not share his concerns, I think it is still worthwhile for you to be aware of them.

To ensure that the IG/CM is not counter-productive to the work SECOM is doing on behalf of the DCI, I propose that the Chairman, SECOM, sit as an observer on the IG/CM to coordinate efforts of the two groups. This would allow Bob to offer SECOM's assistance when appropriate and to keep his committee abreast of what the IG/CM is planning. If you agree, I will see that Bob as well as the DoD Chairman of the IG/CM, when he is named, is apprised of the arrangements.

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Attachment:  
SECOM D-272

**CONFIDENTIAL****DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
Security Committee**

SECOM-D-272

5 August 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM:

  
ChairmanSUBJECT: Interagency Group/Countermeasures 

REFERENCE: DUSD/Policy Memo to D/ICS Dated 2 August 1982

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1. I have discussed the proposal for an Interagency Group/Countermeasures (IG/CM) with  and his staff at some length. Although he is clearly convinced of the necessity for establishing such a body, I continue to be concerned about its possible implications to the DCI Security Committee. My concerns are heightened by the Department of Defense proposal to expand the IG/CM to include Army, Navy and Air Force representatives and to have the chairman selected by the Secretary of Defense.

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2. The IG/CM would be responsible for all national countermeasures policy, to include technical countermeasures and protective security, including personnel, physical, information/document, industrial, computer, communications and operational security. This encompasses the charter of the SECOM. While NSDD 2 mandates the establishment of an IG/CI, the directive does not seem to require creation of an IG/CM, especially a body whose functions are so similar to those of SECOM. The DoD-proposed expansion would provide a structure even more closely paralleling that of SECOM.

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3. The proposed IG/CM has been described as a "sort of court of appeals," to which intractable problems of policy or resources can be brought for high-level resolution. The next level, presumably, is the SIG-I, chaired by the DCI. The SECOM already has a direct path to the DCI for such problems. The IG/CM would simply require the problem to undergo additional filtration enroute to the highest authority in the Intelligence Community.

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Signer

5 Aug 1982

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4. The need for an interagency body to consider security problems and develop policy recommendations is the *raison d'etre* for the SECOM. Its membership comprises the directors of security or senior security policy officers of the Intelligence Community. This should be the most knowledgeable group on security in the US Government. If SECOM has been unable to find solutions to all of the security problems of the Community, it is because of resource constraints, "turf" considerations, or honest differences of opinion. It seems unlikely that department and agency positions will change or resources will increase because issues are escalated to an intermediate level before being brought to the attention of the DCI. ☐

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5. Despite assurances that the IG/CM will meet infrequently, and then only to resolve questions insoluble at lower levels, an inescapable anxiety remains that a group having such a makeup and mission will partially supplant the SECOM without improving the DCI's tools for securing intelligence. Not that SECOM should be invulnerable, but any decision which would affect its utility should be reached with due deliberation, not as an incidental consequence of an apparently unrelated action. A DoD-chaired group, with a preponderantly DoD membership, might soon become the forum of choice to promote DoD initiatives, leaving the SECOM and the DCI with a weakened base to address security. Such a development, I believe, would lead inexorably to the reduction of personnel and physical security standards, which the SECOM has struggled to maintain at a high level, despite protestations, particularly from DoD, that budget constraints made them unaffordable. ☐

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6. In summary, I would urge caution regarding the proposal to create an IG/CM for the following reasons:

a. There is no clear basis for this action in NSDD 2.

b. The SECOM is an existing, established DCI mechanism to recommend policy in virtually all the security disciplines encompassed by the proposed IG/CM.

c. Creation of the IG/CM may have unforeseen and possibly undesirable consequences, such as downgrading security standards in response to a tight budget.

d. Establishment of an additional layer of policy review (IG/CM) will increase administrative burdens on the SECOM membership and staff, without necessarily providing benefits not now available.

e. There is no reason to believe that the IG/CM will have the ability to resolve interagency differences and resource requirements by the simple expedient of taking the matter somewhat higher in the bureaucracy. ☐


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7. If the measure is adopted, I urge the inclusion of a proviso similar to that in the referenced DUSD(P) memorandum, prohibiting the IG/CM from affecting, displacing or being otherwise inconsistent with the responsibilities assigned any department or agency head, or those assigned any other interagency body, by DCI Directive, law, Executive Order or Presidential Directive. ☐

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SUBJECT: Interagency Group/Countermeasures

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